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Abstract—Demand response (DR) is not only a crucial solution
to the demand side management but also a vital means of elec-
tricity market in maintaining power grid reliability, sustainability
and stability. DR can enable consumers (e.g. data centers) to
reduce their electricity consumption when the supply of electricity
is a shortage. The consumers will be rewarded in the case of DR
if they reduce or shift some of their energy usage during peak
hours. Aiming at solving the efficiency of DR, in this paper, we
present MEDR, a mechanism on emergency DR in colocation
data center. First, we formalize the MEDR problem and propose
a dynamic programming to solve the optimization version of
the problem. We then design a deterministic mechanism as a
solution to solve the MEDR problem. We show that our proposed
mechanism is truthful. Next, we prove that our mechanism is
an FPTAS, i.e., it can be approximated within 1 +  for any
given  > 0, while the running time of our mechanism is
polynomial in n and 1/, where n is the number of tenants
in the datacenter. Furthermore, we also give an auction system
covering the efficient FPTAS algorithm as bidding decision
program for DR in colocation datacenter. Finally, we choose a
practical smart grid dataset to build a large number of datasets
for simulation in performance evaluation. By evaluating metrics
of the approximation ratio of our mechanism, the non-negative
utility of tenants and social cost of colocation datacenter, the
results demonstrate the effectiveness of our work.
Index Terms—Emergency Demand Response; Knapsack Prob-
lem; Mechanism Design; Colocation Data Center; Auction
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand response (DR) programs are widely adopted in
many colocation data centers for improving the efficiency of
power grids [1], [2]. It attempts to adjust the demand for
power instead of adjusting the supply. In today’s power grid,
DR is a technique for regulating the energy consumption over
time, which is one of the major reliability impacts for smart
grids [3]. On the consumer side, DR is commonly utilized as
a powerful tool for employing flexibility of using electricity
in response to supply-demand conditions [4]. In smart grid
market when electricity price rises or the system reliability
are threatened, the electricity supplier will firstly deliver the
Remark: this paper is published as main conference paper in IEEE INFO-
COM 2019.
notice of direct compensation, of inductively reducing power
load or signal of power price rise to electricity consumers.
The consumers will change their intrinsic power using mode
so as to meet the demand of electricity supply, reducing or
passing a special period of time of power load, ensuring the
stability of the power grid and restraining the rise of electricity
price. In addition, DR is an important tool of demand-side
management [5] which refers to the way that countries use
policy measures to guide power users to reduce electricity at
peak time, use electricity in low valley, improve power supply
efficiency and optimize the usage of electricity. When it comes
to the emergency demand of using electricity, the demand-side
management will be required to start an immediate response or
incentive mechanism of the user report electricity, and declare
the amount of electricity and the price of electricity.
However, there are few efficient mechanisms and systems
to support efficient power management in current power grid
and many colocation data centers, leading to high power cost
and low efficiency [5]. For example, to reduce peak demand
in a power grid, the DR is usually implemented manually
by sending signals to large consumers, such as data centers.
Besides, it is worthy to note that colocation of data centers is
quite popular now. According to the website1, there are 3, 775
colocation data centers from 112 countries. A colocation is the
third-party leased placement that provides physical homes for
many data centers, and provides lots of services such as fast
Internet, stable power supply and cooling. Though colocation
of data centers provided a nice solution for those enterprise
tenants, it consumed huge electricity. As pointed out in [6], 91
billion kilowatt-hours of electricity was consumed in U.S. in
2013, and it emitted around 97 million metric tons of carbon
pollution in that year. On the other hand, it is possible to close
or migrate some tasks in a large data center such that some
computing servers can be shutdown. This makes possible for
data centers to be participant in DR. In case of emergency (for
example, earthquake or extreme bad weather) or reaching the
1Data collected from http://www.datacentermap.com/ in Jan 7, 2016.
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capacity of a grid, it requires to implement the DR.
Therefore, to improve the efficiency, an incentive reverse
auction mechanism is employed to motivate power users to
participate in DR activities. The basic process of the auction is
as follows. The electricity DR and electricity quota are issued
by the special power management department. After the power
users receive the signal, the electricity price can be reported in
the form of bidding. Then the bidding system runs a bidding
mechanism to choose the group of users, in which users will
perform the restricted electricity consumption behavior in the
DR and achieve corresponding compensations.
In this work, we aim to design an efficient mechanism
to solve the DR problem called MEDR. Actually, there are
several challenges in solving MEDR. It is worth to note
that we could apply the VCG mechanism [7]–[9] to MEDR
problem, and a deterministic truthful mechanism was obtained.
However, the optimization problem of MEDR is NP-hard,
since it generalizes the min-knapsack problem. On the other
hand, approximation algorithms for MEDR might not be
truthful. To the best of our knowledge, Zhang et al. [4] was
the first one to study approximated truthful mechanisms for
MEDR problem. They provided a 2-approximated mechanism
with truthful in expectation. The main technique of their work
is to present a 2-approximated algorithm, and then turn the
approximation algorithm into a mechanism with truthful in
expectation, while keeping the approximation ratio of 2. The
framework of their work is based on a convex decomposition
technique [10], which will transfer an approximation algorithm
into a truthful randomized mechanism.
Our main contribution is to propose a deterministic truthful
mechanism with FPTAS approximated. To the best of our
knowledge, we are not aware of other deterministic approxi-
mated truthful mechanisms. The main technique of our work
is to design a monotone algorithm based on the framework of
Archer and Tardo¨s [11], which is the key idea of designing
deterministic truthful mechanism for one parameter. In detail,
we first design a dynamic programming for the optimization
version of our studied problem, and then applying some
rounding technique such that our design dynamic program-
ming satisfies the monotone property. Furthermore, in our
mechanism, both the cost ci and the size ei of each agent i are
private information. We also implement all the algorithms in a
reverse auction system and a simulation tool for performance
evaluation. The system tool can be used for colocation data
centers or can be extended to be adopted to some other appli-
cations such as auctions in smart grid. Extensive experiments
are presented to evaluate the effectiveness of our method.
Empirical results show that our mechanism achieves nearly
optimal solution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we state the mechanism design problem called MEDR. In
Section III, we propose a dynamic programming to solve the
optimization version of the studied problem. Then we address
an FPTAS deterministic truthful mechanism. In Section V, we
implement a reverse auction system tool and all the algorithms.
Extensive simulation experiments are taken to evaluate the
effectiveness of our method. The related works are presented in
Section VI, and concluding remarks are given in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section we address the statement of a mechanism
design problem on DR for colocation data center.
We study a mechanism design problem MEDR that arises
in data center demand response. There are n tenants in a colo-
cation data center. Each tenant i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} subscribes a
certain amount of power supply from the colocation operator.
In the event of Emergency Demand Response (EDR), the
colocation operator is required to reduce W amount of energy.
Given power-based contracts, tenants may not have incentive
to participate in EDR unless they are awarded. Even if some
tenants are interested in EDR, their reduction may not reach
the reduction target W . In case of not reaching the target, the
colocation operator can use backup energy storage (BES) to
fulfill the shortage of EDR target. Let y be the amount of
grid-power demand reduction due to the usage of BES, and α
be the cost of BES usage per kWh.
Each tenant i submits a bid with two parameters (si, bi),
where si is the amount of planned energy reduction and bi is
the claimed cost due to such a reduction. However, each tenant
i has its own true type (ei, ci), where ci is the cost due to a
reduction of ei energy. The value ei and ci are only known
to the tenant i. Moreover, each tenant is single-minded [12]
such that each tenant is restricted to one single bid. Every
tenant has freedom to choose participation in this EDR or
not. If a tenant is not willing to participate in this EDR, we
can suppose its bid is (0, 0). Let B = {(s1, b1), . . . , (sn, bn)}
be the set of bids by the n tenants. Based on this bidding B,
the colocation operator will pay money Pi(B) to each tenant
i to encourage their participate in this EDR. Let Ui(B) =
Pi(B)− ci be the utility of tenant i according to the biddings
of B. Clearly each tenant i attempts to maximize his/her utility.
According to [4], the power consumption in colocation data
center consists of both the energy consumption of tenants and
also consumption of management such as cooling. There is a
ratio called Power Usage Effectiveness (PUE) γ between the
total energy consumption to the energy consumed by tenants,
which typically ranges from 1.1 to 2.0.
A tenant is a winner if her/his bidding is successful. Let
N be the set of winners. To meet the energy reduction target
W , we require that y + γ
∑
i∈N si ≥ W . The social cost of
the colocation operator is αy +
∑
i∈N Pi(B). The social cost
of tenants is
∑
i∈N (ci − Pi(B)). Thus, the total social cost
is equivalent to aggregate tenant cost due to energy reduction
plus the operator’s cost for using BES, i.e., αy +
∑
i∈N ci.
The goal of the mechanism design is to minimize the total
social cost, meanwhile no tenant can benefit by proposing a
false bidding. The optimization version of this problem can be
formulated as an integer programming. Let xi = 1 if tenant i
is a winner, i.e. i ∈ N , otherwise xi = 0.
min αy +
∑n
i=1 xici (1)
subject to
y + γ
∑n
i=1 xisi ≥W (2)
xi = {1, 0},∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} (3)
The studied MEDR problem is closely related to knapsack
auction problems. According to objective functions, we define
two types of mechanism design for knapsack problems. In
max-knapsack problem, each agent has a private valuation for
having his/her objective in the knapsack. The problem is to
find an allocation of the agents without exceeding the capacity
of the knapsack as so to maximize the sum of each agent’s
value.In min-knapsack problem, each agent has a private cost
for having his/her item in the knapsack. The problem is to find
an allocation to cover the knapsack, while the sum of agents’
cost is minimized.
For any instance I , we define by C(M(I)) the social cost
of the mechanism M, which is the total costs of tenants plus
the operator’s cost for using BES. A mechanism M is said
to be ρ-approximated if C(M(I)) ≤ ρ · C(OPT (I)), where
OPT is an optimal algorithm.
Let B−i = {B1, . . . , Bi−1, Bi+1, . . . , Bn} be the bids
except tenant i’s bid.
Definition 1: (Truthfulness): A mechanismM consisting of
an allocation function A and a payment function P is truthful
(or strategy-proof) if for every tenant i with the true cost
ci cannot increase his/her utility by declaring any other cost
(si, bi) regardless of every bidding of other agents B−i, i.e.,
it satisfies
Ui((ei, ci), B−i) ≥ Ui((si, bi), B−i).
This definition implies that truthful reporting is a dominant
strategy for every tenant.
Definition 2: (Individual rationality): A mechanism M is
said to be individual rationality if every agent always ob-
tains non-negative utility with bidding of the true cost, i.e.,
Ui((ei, ci), B−i) ≥ 0 for any i and any B−i.
III. APPROXIMATED TRUTHFUL MECHANISM
In this section, we will address an approximated truthful
mechanism. We present a dynamic programming to solve the
optimization version of our problem MEDR optimally, and
then we explore a deterministic truthful mechanism while it
is arbitrarily approximated for any given  > 0.
A. Dynamic Programming Model
Our dynamic programming requires to solve the min-
knapsack problem as a subroutine. The min-knapsack problem
consists in finding a subset of items, where each item i has
a cost ci and a size si, with the minimum cost such that
the sum of their sizes is at least as large as a specified
capacity. Based on the idea of the max-knapsack problem [13],
Tauhidul [14] gave a dynamic programming for the min-
knapsack problem. We adopt this dynamic programming in
(4) [14] as a subroutine in the following.
Let S(i, c) denote a subset of {1, . . . , i} whose cost is
exactly c and whose total size is maximized. Let A(i, c) be the
size of S(i, c) (A(i, c) = 0 if no such set exists). The recursive
formula of the dynamic programming is given in (4). In this
formula A(i, c) gives a tabular of an optimal value for each
subproblem (i, c).
A(i, c) =
 max{A(i− 1, c), si +A(i− 1, c− ci)},if ci ≤ c
A(i− 1, c), otherwise
(4)
In the following, we design the dynamic programming for
our MEDR problem based on the recursive function (4). The
Algorithm 1 (Algorithm DOPT (I)) gives the details of the
dynamic programming for our problem MEDR.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm DOPT (I): Dynamic Program-
ming for MEDR
Input: The set of tenants I , and demand capacity W .
1 Run the dynamic programming based on the formula (4)
for the input I , and obtain A(i, c) for each (i, c), where
1 ≤ i ≤ n and 0 ≤ c ≤∑i ci;
2 for each (i, c) do
3 if γA(i, c) < W then
4 y(i, c) = α(W − γA(i, c)) + c
5 else
6 y(i, c) = c
Output: Return min(i,c) y(i, c)
Theorem 1: The dynamic programming DOPT (I) pro-
duces an optimal solution for any instance of tenants I with
demand request W , and unit cost of BES α. The running time
is pseudo-polynomial, which is O(n2cmax), where cmax is the
largest cost.
Proof. Any optimal solution consists of two parts, one is
covered by BES, and another is covered by items from I .
Let p, q be the cost due to tenants I and BES, respectively.
Let cmax = maxi ci be the largest cost among all tenants.
In the dynamic programming we iterate all possible (i, c),
where c ∈ C = {0, 1, 2, . . . , ncmax}. Any cost due to
tenants I is in C, hence p ∈ C. Note that the dynamic
programming A(i, p) provides the maximize size whose cost
is exactly p. If γA(n, p) is less than W , and we require at
least W −γA(n, p) BES to cover the knapsack in the optimal.
Therefore, p+ q ≥ α(W − γA(n, p)) + p. If γA(n, p) ≥ W ,
then q = 0. These two cases are both covered in the dynamic
programming, which implies that the dynamic programming
outputs an optimal solution.
The running time of dynamic programming is O(n2cmax),
since i ≤ n, and c ≤ ncmax, and the running time is bounded
by the iterative function of (i, c). 2
B. Monotone FPTAS Model
Motivated by the truthful mechanism for max-knapsack
problem [15], we will propose a deterministic truthful mecha-
nism. To keep the truthful property, the idea of our mechanism
is to give a monotone algorithm. To obtain an FPTAS, we need
to design a monotone algorithm whose approximation ratio
is arbitrarily close to 1. The detailed algorithm is given in
Algorithm 3, which iteratively calls a subroutine Algorithm 2
(Algorithm Ar(k, I)). The motivation of Algorithm 2 is to
keep the truthful, in which the rounding of each item is
independent on the bidding of all tenants.
Algorithm 2: Algorithm Ar(k, I)
Input: Given parameter k, and the instance
I = (s1, c1), . . . , (sn, cn).
1 Let ak = 2
k
n+1 ;
2 Let T (k) be the subset of items with cost at most of 2k;
We construct a new instance I ′ based on T (k), which is
identical to T (k), but the cost of each item c′ is given
as below.
3 for i ∈ T (k) do
4 c′i = b ciak c
5 Run the dynamic programming DOPT (I ′)for the items
in T (k) with cost c′i, and obtain A(i, c
′);
6 for each (i, c′) do
7 if γA(i, c′) < W then
8 y(i, c′) = bα(W−γA(i,c′))ak c+ c′
9 else
10 y(i, c′) = c′
Output: Return min(i,c′) y(i, c′)
Algorithm 3: Monotone FPTAS AFPTAS
Input: Given  > 0, and the instance I .
1 Let best←∞, and cmax = maxi ci.
2 for k ← 1 to log cmax do
3 S′(k)← Ar(k, I); /* call Algorithm 2 (Algorithm
Ar(k, I)) */
4 if S′(k) < best then
5 best← S′(k)
6 S¯ ← the subset items that contained in the
solution of S′(k)
Output: S¯, and use BES W − γ∑i∈S¯ si
Lemma 1: For any  > 0, Algorithm AFPTAS has approx-
imation ratio of 1 + , and its running time is polynomial in
1/, n, log cmax.
Proof. Let cq be the largest cost among the items in an optimal
algorithm to cover the knapsack. Define k∗, such that
2k
∗−1 < cq ≤ 2k∗ .
Denote O∗ to be the subset of items in the optimal solution.
Let y∗ be the size BES used in the optimal solution. Let
O∗(R) = O∗
⋃{R}, where R is a virtual item with size y∗
and cost αy∗. Let OPT be the cost of the optimal solution.
We have OPT ≥ cq .
Note that in T (k∗) as denoted in the algorithm Ar(k, I), we
have O∗ ⊆ T (k∗). Let S¯ be the subset of items returned by
the algorithm Ar(k, I) with k∗ as the parameter, and let (¯i, c¯)
be the pair of values that reaches the minimum of Ar(k, I).
Let O′ be the subset of items with costs rounded by 2k
∗
from O∗. Let R′ be a virtual item with size y∗/ak∗ .
Let ALG be the final cost incurred by the algorithm
AFPTAS , we can use the following inequalities to approximate
the cost by the algorithm with the optimal solution.
ALG =
∑
i∈S¯
ci + max(α(W − γA(¯i, c¯)), 0)
≤
∑
i∈S¯
ci + max(bα(W − γA(¯i, c¯))
a∗k
c, 0)ak∗ + ak∗
≤
∑
i∈S¯
(c′i · ak∗ + ak∗) +
max(bα(W − γA(¯i, c¯))
a∗k
c, 0) · ak∗ + ak∗
≤
∑
i∈S¯
c′i · ak∗ + max(b
α(W − γA(¯i, c¯))
a∗k
c, 0) · ak∗
+(n+ 1)ak∗
≤
∑
i∈O′⋃{R′} c
′
i · ak∗ + (n+ 1)ak∗
≤
∑
i∈O∗⋃{R} ci + (n+ 1)ak∗
≤ OPT + 2k∗
≤ (1 + 2)OPT.
The running time is poly(1/, n, log cmax). In algorithm
Ar(k, I), the largest cost of T (k) is 2k, the running time of
dynamic programming is O(n3/). The total running time of
AFPTAS is O( 1n
3 log cmax). 2
1) Monotone: A declaration B′i = (s
′
i, b
′
i) is said to be a
higher declaration than the bidding Bi = (si, bi) if s′i ≥ si
and b′i ≤ bi, i.e. Bi  B′i. A bid (si, bi) is said to be a winner
declaration if this item is selected in the knapsack.
Definition 3: (Monotone) We say that an algorithm A is
monotone if, for any bidder (si, bi) is a winning declaration
then any higher declaration also wins.
Bitonic was introduced by Mu’Alem and Nisan [16] for
maximize problems, such as multi-unit auction, and it was
generalized by Briest, Krysta, and Vo¨cking [15].
In this work, we apply the technique of bitonic to the
minimize problems.
Definition 4: (Bitonic) Given a function f : An →, a
monotone algorithm A is bitonic with respect to the function
f if for any agent i, the following hold:
1) If i ∈ A(B), then f(A(Bi, B−i)) ≥ f(A(B′i, B−i)) for
any Bi  B′i.
2) If i 6∈ A(B), then f(A(Bi, B−i)) ≥ f(A(B′i, B−i)) for
any B′i  Bi.
Intuitively, a monotone algorithm A is bitonic with respect
to f if f is a monotone non-decreasing function of each
agent’s valuation while she is not selected for the solution,
but becomes monotone non-increasing after she is selected
for the solution. In this work, the function f is the objective
function, i.e., the social welfare. The bitonic is indeed required
to guarantee the monotone for compositions of algorithms.
Algorithm 4: MIN(A1, A2) Operator
Input: Bidding B
1 Run the algorithm A1 and A2;
2 Let swA1(B) and swA2(B) be the social welfare of
Algorithm A1 and A2, respectively.
3 if swA1(B) ≤ swA2(B) then
4 return A1(B);
5 else
6 return A2(B).
Lemma 2: Let A1 and A2 be two monotone bitonic allo-
cation algorithms. Then, M = MIN(A1, A2) is a monotone
bitonic allocation algorithm.
Proof. This can be easily extended from the proof of the
Theorem 2 in [16], which was designed for the MAX operator.
2
Lemma 3: Algorithm Ar(k, I) is monotone and bitonic with
respect to the objective function.
Proof. Algorithm Ar(k, I) returns an optimal solution, if an
agent reports a higher bidder, then the optimal algorithm will
accept this item too. Suppose an agent i was not selected,
and any lower declaration B′i, if this item was accepted then
the objective function shall be smaller, otherwise the objective
remains, and hence the objective function is non-increasing for
any lower bidders. Thus the property of bitonic follows. 2
Lemma 4: Algorithm AFPTAS is monotone and bitonic with
respect to the objective function.
Proof. The lemma follows immediately according to Lemma 2
and Lemma 3. 2
2) Payment:
Definition 5: (Critical payment) Let algorithm A be a
monotone algorithm, if we fix the declaration B−i, and then
for any agent i and fixed bidding si, there exists a unique
cost θAi , called critical payment, such that ∀bi ≤ θAi , bi is a
winning declaration, and ∀bi > θAi is a losing declaration.
To calculate the critical value for any agent j, we fix the
other agents’ bids, and then use a binary search on interval
[bj ,maxj bj ] and repeatedly run the allocation algorithm A to
check whether the agent j is selected.
Definition 6: The payment pA associated with the monotone
allocation algorithm A that is based on the critical value
is defined by pAj = θ
A
j if agent j wins with allocation
Alloci(B) = si, and pAj = 0 otherwise.
A mechanism MA = (A, pA) is normalized , if its payment
pA is defined as in Definition 6, i.e. agents that are not selected
pay 0. We say that algorithm A is exact if Alloci(B) = si or
Alloci(B) = ∅ for each declaration (si, bi).
In this work, we only consider a limited type of agent called
single-minded, the cost function ∞ if Alloci(B) > si and ci
otherwise. That will force each agent does not over bidding
his/her size if allocation algorithm is an exact algorithm.
Theorem 2: [15] Let A be a monotone and exact algorithm
for some minimization problems and single-minded agents.
Then mechanism MA = (A, pA) is truthful.
Proof. In [15], they gave the detailed proof for utilitarian
problems, and thus it holds for MAX-knapsack problem.
Moreover, in their paper, it was shown that the proof is
valid for minimization problems, such as the reverse single-
minded multi-unit auction problem, which is equivalent to the
minimum knapsack problem. 2
Algorithm 5: Algorithm PA(B)
Input: The bidding B of all tenants, and the allocation
algorithm A
1 for i← 1 to n do
2 Let zi = 1 if the ith item is selected in the knapsack
by the allocation problem A(B), and 0 otherwise.
3 Let h = αγsi and l = bi.
4 while h− l ≥ 1 do
5 b′i = (h+ l)/2;
6 zi = A(B−i, (si, b′i));
7 if zi == 1 then
8 l = b′i
9 else
10 h = b′i
11 Pi(B)← l.
Output: The payment Pi(B) for each agent i.
Theorem 3: The mechanism MAFPTAS =
(AFPTAS , p
AFPTAS ) is truthful and it is an FPTAS
mechanism, i.e. its approximation ratio is 1 +  for any
given  > 0, and the total running time of the mechanism is
polynomial in 1/, n, log cmax.
Proof. Algorithm PA(B) (Algorithm 5) is a critical payment,
Algorithm AFPTAS is an exact algorithm, and bitonic with
respect to the objective function according to Lemma 4. Thus
the mechanism MAFPTAS is truthful followed by Theorem 2.
The FPTAS is achieved in Lemma 1.
2
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we provide a reverse auction system (RAS)
to solve the MEDR problem and implement all the algorithms
for DR on colocation data centers.
A. Reverse Auction System
The architecture of the RAS is shown in Fig. 1. The whole
system framework consists of two parts, namely, client and
server. The client refers to users including the bidding tenants
and the colocation data center operator. The server is a MEDR
auction system, which is implemented and run as a service.
This service program involves three primary function modules,
that is, auction controller (AC), bidding decision (BD) and
power controller (PC), respectively.
The AC module is responsible for interaction with client
users, including receiving the client tenants’ bidding applica-
tion, invoking bidding decision (BD) to make a bidding deci-
sion, and returning back the bidding decision results to client
users. The BD module implements all the MEDR algorithms
presented in Section III, including the dynamic programming
algorithm ADOPT , the monotone FPTAS algorithm AFPTAS
and the payment algorithm APayment. All the algorithms are
developed by C/C++ language, and are integrated together as
an independent service program. The PC module takes charge
of executing power supply policies for balancing power using
according to the bidding results. In particular, the RAS runs
in a colocation data center for all tenants and the colocation
operator.
Server
Tenant 1t Tenant 2t Tenant Nt ...
Colocation datacenterl ti  t t
2. Submit bids(si,bi)
4. Output 
decision results
Auction 
controller
Colocation 
Operator
l ti  
r t r
Clientli t
Bidding Decision
FPTAS/DOPT
Power 
controller
6. Send policy of 
power supply
5. Return winning bids,
utility, payments
1. Send EDR signals and 
Launch EDR auction
MEDR Auction System 
3.Invoke decision
(bids,W,α,γ,ε) 
Fig. 1. Architecture of MEDR auction system
B. Reverse Auction Process
As shown in Fig. 1, the basis process of reverse auction
is as follows. At first, upon arrival of DR or EDR signals in
client, the colocation operator (Auctioneer) will firstly launch
an auction in RAS and send the EDR signal to tenants. The
tenants who are willing to participate then submit their own
bids with the size of power and costs to the RAS server.
Then, the AC receives the bids from client tenant users,
and then ask for BD to process the bidding decision when the
system needs to make decision of bidding. In bidding decision,
BD invokes FPTAS to make a decision. Before invoking, BD
needs to input the bidding data and the value of decision
algorithm required parameters, such as EDR W , α, γ, and
, etc. BD will input all data from the AC and calls a decision
algorithm to get bidding decision results. After running the
decision algorithms, it outputs the bidding decision results to
the AC.
Further, the AC returns back the bidding decision results to
the client. The results include the winning bids, and payments.
In the end, not only the winning tenants will achieve compen-
sation rewards from the colocation data center operator, but
also the new policy of power supply will be submitted to the
PC and be executed for the DR.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we firstly generate simulation datasets.
We then do holistic simulation experiments to evaluate the
efficiency of FPTAS mechanism which further validates the
effectiveness of our RAS system performance.
A. Simulation Datasets
We consider a colocation data center, with N(N = 9) par-
ticipating tenants (denoted as Tenant #1, Tenant #2, ...,Tenant
#9). Each tenant i has mi(= 100, 000) homogeneous servers.
The power of each server includes 150W computing power
and d0 = 100W idle power. That is to say, if a server is
turned off, then we can obtain 100W power. If a server is
running a workload, it needs 150 + 100 = 250W power.
For simplicity, we produce simulation datasets according to
the datasets used in [4], including total EDR energy reduc-
tion by PJM on January 7, 2014 and normalized workload
traces which are collected from [17] (“Hotmail” and “MSR”)
and [18] (“Wikipedia”), as shown in Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b).
The EDR energy reduction data consists of eleven event
numbers. Each number represents an energy reduction of
demand response arise in one hour period of time. The eleven
time periods are made up of a range in hour from 5 to 11 and
from 16 to 19. Moreover, we get the specific data from the
two figures and list in Table I in detail. Like Zhang [4], we
further generate EDR energy reduction targets as 15% of the
total EDR, which lists in the W column of Table I.
The tenants’ bids data are generated randomly with consid-
eration of the workload traces and some data center factors,
such as the general cost of a server or whole data center and
the energy price in market. We duplicate each workload for all
tenants with randomness up to 20%. For the total 9 tenants, we
firstly generate 9 random numbers ri, where i = 1, 2, . . . , 9,
between 0.01 and 0.20. In our simulation, the random numbers
are 0.11, 0.06, 0.02, 0.13, 0.05, 0.01, 0.15, 0.16, 0.02. Then we
duplicate the workload for three tenants by Hotmail, three
by MSR and three by Wikipedia, respectively. We assume
that each size of the workload denotes a ratio of the total
number of servers which is in running status. If we turn off
some servers then we can slash energy consumption. The total
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Fig. 2. The source dataset for bidding decision simulation.
energy reduction by tenant i is si = ni.d0,i.T , where T = 1
hour in simulation.
We conclude the size of tenants’ bid by a formula:
si = workloads ∗ M ∗ ri ∗ d0/1, 000, 000(MW ), where
M = 100, 000 and d0 = 100. The final range of size s is
between 10 ∼ 80. The workloads use data shown in Table I.
Besides, according to Zhang [4], tenants can reasonably save
6.7 ∼ 13.3 cents/kWh (depending on electricity price) power
when they house servers in their data centers. Equivalently,
tenants can save 67 ∼ 133 $/MWh. Hence we produce several
random numbers rb between 67$ and 133$ for each tenant as
a bid power price which tenants are willing to take part in the
auction activity. The ith tenant bid is concluded by formula
bi = si ∗ rbi. All produced simulation data are in Table II.
Each tenant bid Bi has two numbers si, bi, which denote a
size of energy reduction and cost for supplying its responding
size of power, respectively.
TABLE I
EDR TARGET & WORKLOAD
Time(h) EDR W(15%EDR) Hotmail MSR Wikipedia
5 450 68 0.21 0.52 0.29
6 800 120 0.30 0.52 0.20
7 1,350 203 0.33 0.52 0.20
8 1,750 263 0.42 0.51 0.25
9 2,100 315 0.44 0.49 0.21
10 2,080 312 0.45 0.45 0.22
11 1,850 278 0.46 0.41 0.22
16 1,250 188 0.50 0.30 0.50
17 1,800 270 0.48 0.28 0.40
18 2,350 353 0.52 0.29 0.40
19 2,250 338 0.43 0.30 0.50
The PUE of colocation γ is set to 1.6 (typical for colo-
cation), and the default cost for using BES, α is considered
150$/MWh which we will vary later depending on the BES
energy source.
B. Experiment and Result Analysis
To evaluate the performance of the MEDR method, we
consider the approximation ratio of the FPTAS mechanism,
tenants’ utility and social cost reductions. For simplification,
we prepare all the simulation data and related parameter data
of algorithms together into a file which is used as input for the
bidding decision program. During the test running process, our
bidding decision program will read the data in a batch, process
all the algorithms execution, and then output all results to a
file for analysis.
1) Approximation Ratios: Our FPTAS mechanism can
achieve 1 +  approximation ratio. Though FPTAS ensures
the running time is polynomial in n, and 1/. To evaluate
the efficiency of the FPTAS mechanism in practice, we use
approximation ratio metric which is concluded by the ratio
between the FPTAS-approximation algorithm and the DOPT
optimal, i.e. AR = y(FPTAS)/y(DOPT ). In the simula-
tion, we vary the parameters α, γ, and  to run the FPTAS and
DOPT algorithm to obtain the results respectively. In each test,
we fix two parameters and change one parameter regularly.
Obviously we have three cases of ratio testing, which are
named as α-ratio test, γ-ratio test and -ratio test, respectively.
In α-ratio test, we set γ to 1.6 and set  to 0.5 and vary the
parameter α with a range from 140 to 320 with an increasing
step 20. In γ-ratio test,  is set to 0.5, α is set to 180$, and γ
is changed from 1.1 to 2 with an increasing step 0.1. In -ratio
test, α is set to 180$, γ is set to 1.6, and γ is changed from
1.1 to 2 with an increasing step 0.1.
We run the tests for all the 11 EDR reduction instances.
The results are shown in Fig. 3. We observe that all ratios are
between 1 and 1 + . Moreover, the ratios are closer to the
line with ratio 1. It means that the FPTAS solution is very
close to the optimal solution. Most of the line with ratios of
varying α seems to be more flat which means the α parameter
has little impact on the ratios. There are several broken lines
in Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 3(c). It demonstrates that the ratio exists
a special sensitivity to parameters γ and . The largest impact
factor is the parameter . With the increasing of , the ratio
increases as well as in theory.
2) Agents’ Utilities: We study each agent’s utility in all the
experiments. Note that agents’ utilities are concluded from the
payment for each tenant subtracts his/her actual cost. Actually,
we got that each tenant obtains a non-negative utility in our
experiment. We only show the result in Fig. 4(a) by letting
α = 180$, γ = 1.6,  = 0.5. We illustrate each winner tenant’s
utility in each hour. Fig. 4(a) shows that the case of the 18th
hour time has the largest utility and the 5th hour time has the
minimum utility.
3) Social Cost Reduction Compared to BES only: Each
winner tenant has obtained a non-negative utility, which im-
plies that the colocation operator will pay a lot of money to
these tenants. To study whether this payment is too much, we
investigate the social costs when we only use BES. The results
are illustrated in Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 4(c) when the parameters
α and γ vary. The results reveal that the social costs given by
the FPTAS mechanism is much smaller than that one of BES
only. The percentages are declined when α or γ increases.
So it’s very important for the colocation data center to enable
more tenants to attend the energy demand response activities.
TABLE II
THE TENANT BID DATA
Hour Tenant#1 Tenant#2 Tenant#3 Tenant#4 Tenant#5 Tenant#6 Tenant#7 Tenant#8 Tenant#9
s1 b1 s2 b2 s3 b3 s4 b1 s5 b5 s6 b6 s7 b7 s8 b8 s9 b9
5 23 2,737 12 1,284 4 352 67 4,623 26 2,704 5 555 43 3,569 46 5,888 5 570
6 33 3,531 18 1,782 6 648 67 8,710 26 2,392 5 470 57 4,617 60 5,100 7 588
7 36 3,960 19 1,653 6 462 67 6,700 26 1,976 5 605 30 3,960 32 3,136 4 364
8 46 5,336 25 1,950 8 784 66 6,864 25 2,350 5 585 37 4,440 40 4,240 5 565
9 48 3,600 26 2,262 8 960 63 8,064 24 1,656 4 476 31 3,162 33 3,564 4 516
10 49 4,018 27 3,159 9 792 58 5,510 22 2,112 4 332 33 3,267 35 2,590 4 456
11 50 6,000 27 3,078 9 693 53 5,353 20 2,440 4 340 33 3,102 35 3,115 4 384
16 55 3,960 30 2,160 10 1,150 39 3,159 15 1,995 3 399 75 7,950 80 8,320 10 1,290
17 52 4,420 28 2,016 9 1,170 36 4,068 14 1,484 2 178 60 7,620 64 4,352 8 952
18 57 7,581 31 3,100 10 1,030 37 4,144 14 1,358 2 212 60 6,540 64 7,360 8 712
19 47 4,136 25 3,275 8 744 39 5,031 15 1,380 3 270 75 7,725 80 5,760 10 930
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Fig. 3. The performance evaluation on approximation ratios in distinct time of EDR instances.
VI. RELATED WORKS
Besides the work in [4], there are several existing research
on mechanism design on DR. Ren and Islam [19] studied
the mechanism design for colocation demand response, but
their mechanism is not truthful and may not meet the target
of EDR. Chen et al. [20] studied the green colocation data
centers by designing a pricing mechanism to fulfill energy
reduction requirement for EDR. The energy reduction from
tenants is calculated by the price-taking and price-anticipating
equilibrium. Zhou et al. [21] studied demand resource on geo-
distributed cloud through VCG-based mechanism, in which the
utility of each agent depends highly on its interactive work-
load. Sun et al. [22] considered fairness among the mechanism
design and provided online mechanism with competitive ratio
of 3.2 in expectation. Ahmed et al. [23] proposed a contract-
based mechanism, in which the colocation operator offers a
set of contracts (i.e., a pair of energy reduction and rewards)
to tenants and tenants can voluntarily select none or one of
the contracts to accept, while the objective is to minimize
the operator’s cost, the sum of rewards plus the cost of
BES. Islam et al. [24] reduced the operator’s cost by learning
tenants’ response to reward. Tran et al. [25] used a two-stage
Stackelberg game to model the economic demand response
where the operator can adjust an elastic energy reduction
target.
A closely related work is DR in smart grids. Zhou et
al. [6] studied the mechanism design on DR in smart grids.
Let α = 1, and there is an upper bound on the BES, i.e.
y ≤ zmax. A randomized FPTAS mechanism was given in [6].
Their idea is to combine with smooth analysis and randomize
auction. Actually, Dough and Roughgarden [26] showed that
if there exists an FPTAS approximation, then this algorithm
can be transformed into a truthful in expectation mechanism
that retains the FPTAS property. The work in [26] does not
require the existence of FPTAS. However, it still remains open
whether there exists a deterministic FPTAS.
Briest et al. [15] presented a truthful FPTAS for the max-
knapsack problem. Our problem differs from the min-knapsack
in which we have BES such that the capacity of the knapsack
we need to cover is soft.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a deterministic truthful
FPTAS mechanism with 1+ approximation ratio for a reverse
auction of EDR in colocation data centers. We have developed
an auction system and implemented a bidding decision tool for
simulation experiments. The experimental results demonstrate
the effectiveness of our methods. In future work, we study the
more practical utility of our mechanism and the performance
optimization with parallelization techniques for the dynamical
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Fig. 4. The performance evaluation on tenants’ utility and social costs.
programming. Besides, the provided technique allows us to
deal with single minded agents, and both the size of energy
and the cost are private information. Many open problems arise
in the area of demand response. For example, agents are multi-
minded.
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